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Abstract 
Individual risk preference may change after experiencing external socio-economic or natural 
shocks. Theoretical predictions and empirical studies suggest that risk taking may increase or 
decrease after experiencing shocks. So far the empirical evidence is sparse, especially when it 
comes to developed countries. We contribute to this literature by investigating whether 
experiencing financial and health-related damage caused by storms affects risk preference of 
individuals in Germany. Using unique panel data, we find that households who report storm 
damage increased their risk taking. We do not find evidence of exposure to storm per see 
(regardless of damage experience), which suggests that households have to suffer damage for 
their risk preference to be affected. These results are robust across a battery of alternative 
model specifications and alternative storm damage measures (magnitude of financial 
damage). We rule out other potential explanations such as health-related and economic 
shocks. The self-reported storm damage data is broadly confirmed by regional storm damage 
data provided by the insurance industry. While we cannot identify the channels through which 
experiencing storm damage affects risk preference from our data, we suggest and discuss 
some potential channels. The results may have important policy implications as risk 
preference affects, for instance, individuals’ savings and investment behaviour, adoption of 
self-protection and self-insurance strategies, and technology adoption. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a growing literature that argues individuals’ risk preference may change in response 
to experiencing socio-economic and natural shocks such as natural disasters, civil wars, and 
both macroeconomic and financial crises. On the one hand, such shocks may increase risk 
vulnerability through updating background risk (Gollier and Pratt, 1996). On the other hand, 
individuals may exhibit risk loving due to variations in the way people evaluate changes in 
gains and losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), 
complementarity of independent risks (Quiggin, 2003), or emotional reaction (Lerner and 
Keltner, 2001). The empirical literature examining the impact of shocks on risk preference 
yields mixed results with regard to the direction of the change. Some studies find increase in 
risk aversion after experiencing macroeconomic shocks (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011), 
financial crises (Guiso et al., 2013), land reform (Di Tella et al., 2007), violence (Callen et al., 
2014), and natural disasters (Andrabi and Das, 2010; Cassar et al., 2011; Cameron and Shah, 
2015). However, other studies find that experiencing violence (Voors et al., 2012) and natural 
disasters (Eckel et al., 2009; Hanaoka et al., 2014; Page et al., 2014) makes individuals more 
risk loving. Some studies find no significant effect of drought or excess rainfall (Voors et al., 
2012) and tsunami (Callen, 2011) on risk preference while others find heterogeneous impacts 
after exposure to a natural disaster (Li et al., 2011; Ali Bchir and Willinger, 2013).  
In light of these mixed theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, it remains an empirical 
question whether experiencing socio-economic or natural shocks affect risk preference. 
Understanding this effect is very important as risk preference affects, for instance, 
individuals’ savings and investment behaviour (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989), adoption of 
self-protection and self-insurance strategies (Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985), and technology 
adoption (Liu, 2013). 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of experiencing storm damages on risk preference of 
households using a longitudinal dataset from a standardized survey among German 
households conducted in 2012 and 2014. Much of the damage from natural disasters in 
Germany comes from storm and hail. For instance, in 2007 a total insured damage of 2.06 
billion euros in the German economy (GDV, 2015) was caused by storms. The period 
between 2012 and 2014 also saw one of the largest storm events; namely, a storm called 
“Christian” in October 2013. Our identification strategy exploits the differences in storm 
damage on household level. In particular, we compare risk preference of households that 
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report a storm damage only in the second survey wave (treatment group) with households that 
do not report such damage in any of the survey periods (control group). We find an increase 
in risk taking among households who experienced storm damage between the survey waves. 
We do not find evidence of exposure to storm per see (regardless of damage experience) 
which suggests that households have to suffer damage for their risk preference to be affected. 
These results are robust across a battery of specifications, for instance, including socio-
economic variables as well as regional level and individual fixed effects, alternative 
definitions of the control group, alternative estimation models such as propensity score 
matching and ordered probit models, and alternative measure of storm related damage 
(magnitude of financial damage). We find that the self-reported damage correlates quite well 
with storm insurance data and the treatment effect is stronger for regions which were highly 
affected by the storm “Christian” in October 2013. We rule out alternative explanations such 
as health, economic or other extreme weather shocks. 
While we cannot identify the channels through which experiencing storm damage affects risk 
preference from our data, we suggest some potential channels in the discussion of the results. 
These include emotional changes, reception of compensation from insurance, and the 
difference between expected and actual storm damage. 
Our paper adds to the growing empirical evidence on the impact of socio-economic and 
natural shocks on risk preference. Firstly, while many of the aforementioned studies focus on 
developing countries, our paper contributes to the very limited evidence on the effect of 
natural hazard on risk preference in a developed country context. We are aware of three 
studies focusing on the effects of natural hazards on risk preference in the US  
(Eckel et al., 2009), Australia (Page et al., 2014), and Japan (Hanaoka et al., 2014). For 
Europe, there is no empirical evidence on the implications of natural hazards on risk 
preference so far. Secondly, most of the previous studies use cross-section data while the 
longitudinal nature of our data enables us to follow both the treatment and control groups 
before and after the storm damage happened.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and empirical 
method used for this analysis while Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results. 
Section 4 presents and discusses robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Data and Econometric Method 
2.1 Data Description 
The data we use for this study comes from a nation-wide longitudinal household survey 
among representative German households. A total of 4496 households were interviewed via 
either an online or TV-based1 questionnaire in two rounds (2012 and 2014). Among others, 
the survey includes measures of risk preference of the heads of households as well as the 
households’ experiences with different extreme weather events such as floods and storms. 
Similarly, the survey includes various socio-demographic variables as well as economic and 
health-related concerns. The availability of a novel longitudinal dataset covering risk 
preference and information on extreme weather experiences allows a detailed empirical 
analysis of this topic in a developed country context. A more detailed exposition on the 
sampling design is given in Osberghaus and Philippi (2015) and Osberghaus (2015). Table 1 
presents the share of households who experienced storm damage in 2012 and 2014. 
 
Table 1: Overall distribution of storm-related financial and health damage experience across sample households 
 Survey 
 2012 2014 
Reporting financial or health damage from storm 1,439 1,510 
No reporting of financial or health damage from storm 4,928 4,921 
Total number of householdsa 6,367 6,431 
Share of households who experience damage from storm, in % 22.60 23.48 
a) The total number of households is higher than the sample size in our analysis because 
some households participated only in one survey wave. 
Households were asked to indicate if any of the listed events (including storms) have ever 
caused financial damage or health damage such that a doctor was consulted. The formulation 
of the question does not allow conclusions about the timing of the damage experience, but 
elicits the occurrence of the mere damage at some point in time after the first survey, yet, 
before the second survey. Out of the 4,496 sample households, 583 report storm damage both 
in 2012 and 2014, 2,986 households did not experience such a damage in any of the survey 
periods, and 457 households report no storm damage in 2012 but in 2014 (this means they 
must have experienced a damage in between). The remaining 470 households report having 
                                                          
1 For the purpose of representativeness, households in the panel without internet access are provided with a 
device connected with their TV. Thereby they can participate in the survey by TV. 
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experienced damage in the first wave, while in the second wave, they report never having 
experienced such damage.  
Risk taking is measured on an 11-point Likert scale. Households were asked to indicate the 
degree of their risk taking on a scale from 0 (risk averse) to 10 (very prepared to take risks). 
The fact that our risk taking variable is a self-reported measure may raise a concern on 
whether it reflects the underlying risk preference of households. However, many studies show 
that such measure is a reliable predictor of the actual risk seeking behaviour (e.g., Barsky et 
al., 1997; Donkers et al., 2001; Dohmen et al., 2011). For instance, Dohmen et al. (2011) 
compare the results of risk taking using an identical 11-point scale survey measure with an 
incentivized field experiment based on Holt and Laury (2002) among German individuals. 
They conclude that the used survey measure is a good predictor of the actual risk-taking 
behaviour and hence is a valid instrument to infer actual risk-taking behaviour. 
We are interested in estimating the risk preference of households who report storm damage 
between 2012 and 2014 as compared to those who did not report storm damage in any of the 
surveys. For convenience, we label 457 households who report storm damage between 2012 
and 2014 as our treatment group, while the 2,986 households who did not report storm 
damage in both survey periods are our main control group. The 583 households who report 
storm damage both in 2012 and 2014 are included as additional control group (see robustness 
checks). The 470 households who report damage in 2012 but no longer in 2014 require 
special attention (see robustness checks) and hence are excluded from our main analysis.  
Table 2 compares risk taking and other socio-demographic variables of the two household 
groups at the baseline (2012). The comparison shows that both treatment and control groups 
have statistically similar pre-treatment risk preference. Both groups are also similar in terms 
of pre-treatment gender, education, and employment status. However, households in the 
treatment group have higher income, household size, and older household head than the 
control group. 
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Table 2: Risk preferences in treatment and control groups in base year (2012 survey) 
 Control  
Group 
Treatment  
Group 
Difference 
Risk preference  5.819 
(0.038) 
5.798  
(0.092) 
0.021 
(0.103) 
Gender (1 if female) 0.310 
(0.009) 
0.280 
(0.021) 
0.030 
(0.023) 
Age† 52.009 
(.244) 
53.260 
(0.595) 
-1.251* 
(0.665) 
Income 2794.12 
(26.15) 
3081.23 
(64.51) 
-287.12*** 
(70.984) 
Household size 2.137 
(0.020) 
2.401 
(0.054) 
-0.264*** 
(0.054) 
Education (1 if higher 
educated) 
0.477 
(0.009) 
0.454 
(0.023) 
0.024 
(0.025) 
Employment status (1 if 
employed) 
0.712 
(0.008) 
0.698 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.023) † When we include households who reported storm damage in both survey rounds into 
our control group (see robustness checks in section 4), the age difference disappears. 
2.2 Econometric Method and Identification Strategy 
The identification strategy exploits storm-related financial or health damage reported by the 
heads of households. We use a difference-in-differences approach and compare risk 
preference of households that report storm damage (treatment group) between the survey 
rounds with those that did not report storm damage (control group) before and during that 
period. As compared to a simple comparison between the treatment and control groups in the 
second period, this approach removes potential biases that may arise from permanent 
differences between the two groups and trends. More explicitly, we estimate the following 
difference-in-differences (DID) equation:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =  𝛽𝛽0  +  𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 +   𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 +  𝛽𝛽3( 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇)  +  𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is risk preference of household 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑇𝑇. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is a dummy variable for 
households who report storm damage after 2012 (equal to one if the household reports storm 
damage after the 2012 survey, zero otherwise). 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 stands for a period after the treatment 
households reported storm damage (a dummy that takes a value equal to one for 2014, zero 
otherwise).  𝛽𝛽1 captures potential pre-treatment differences in risk preference between the 
treatment group and control group households. Our main parameter of interest, 𝛽𝛽3, captures 
the interaction effect between storm damage and the latter survey year (2014).  𝛽𝛽4 captures the 
effect of other time-varying and time-invariant covariates. 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 captures regional level fixed 
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effects, while 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 captures other unobserved factors that may induce heterogeneity in risk 
preference. 
Our main parameter of interest, 𝛽𝛽3, measures the treatment effect, which is the effect of storm 
damage on risk preference. Considering storm experience as a natural hazard exogenous to 
households, the longitudinal nature of our data, and our identification strategy, we believe that 
our results measure the appropriate causality. We estimate the model in (1) with OLS. Since 
our dependent variable is an ordinal variable measured on an 11-point Likert scale, we also 
re-estimate the model in (1) using an ordered probit model. All these specifications give the 
same results. Similarly, re-estimating our model with individual fixed effects does not change 
our main result. 
One matter of concern with our storm-related financial and health damage variable is the fact 
that it is self-reported and may be affected by unobserved individual characteristics. Namely, 
some heads of households may recall a storm event and the consecutive financial damage 
better than others. Hence, our data can only serve as a rough measure for the actual exposure 
to storm events in Germany. Nevertheless, we expect these individual-specific effects to be 
time-invariant and thus not affecting our main results. We also estimate our model using 
propensity score matching in order to mitigate the effect of differences in the propensity to 
report storm damage. Moreover, we alternatively use insured damage from the storm 
“Christian” in October 2013 as reported by insurance companies (GDV, 2015). For instance, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony are the two regions afflicted with the largest property 
damage by “Christian”, followed by Hamburg and Bremen. On the other hand, regions such 
as Saxony and Bavaria experienced the smallest property damage for this event. We therefore 
categorize regions based on the intensity of actual property damage. We find that the 
treatment effect is very large for regions that are hit hardest while this effect is insignificant 
for regions where the damage is minor.2 In addition, the propensity to report storm damage in 
our survey is highest for regions affected by “Christian”. 
3. Estimation Results 
Table 3 presents estimation results for risk preference. In column 1, we present a basic model 
with only the treatment and time variables. In column 2, we add socio-demographic controls 
                                                          
2
 These results are not presented here, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
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while in column 3, we include regional level fixed effects. Column 4 presents estimates with 
individual fixed effects. 
Table 3: OLS regression of the effect of storm damage experience on risk preference, difference-in-differences estimates3 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇   -0.023 
(0.099) 
-0.074 
(0.105) 
-0.079 
(0.106) 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇  -0.119*** 
(0.034) 
-0.138*** 
(0.039) 
-0.107** 
(0.054) 
-0.103*** 
(0.036) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇  0.231** 
(0.095) 
0.225** 
(0.109) 
0.245** 
(0.110) 
0.235** 
(0.102) 
Female  -0.459*** 
(0.074) 
-0.467*** 
(0.074) 
 
Age  0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
 
Ln (income)  0.263*** 
(0.070) 
0.271*** 
(0.071) 
0.039 
(0.124) 
Household size  -0.056* 
(0.032) 
-0.058* 
(0.032) 
-0.035 
(0.057) 
Education   0.163** 
(0.068) 
0.161** 
(0.068) 
-0.053 
(0.200) 
Employment status  -0.003 
(0.090) 
-0.002 
(0.090) 
0.076 
(0.148) 
Region fixed effects No No Yes No 
Individual fixed 
effects 
No No No Yes 
Constant 5.819*** 
(0.038) 
3.136*** 
(0.532) 
3.258*** 
(0.570) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
R-squared 0.001 0.033 0.037 0.004 
Number of 
observations 
6,879 5,733 5,729 5,730 
Note: ***, **, and * represents significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at household level. The region fixed effects comprises the 16 regions in 
Germany. Treatment, Female, and Age variables are dropped in the fixed effects estimation 
due to collinearity. Replacing household size with number of children or including number of 
children under 18 does not change our results.  
As can be seen from column 1 of table 3, experiencing storm damage increases risk seeking of 
households as compared to the control group. The estimated results are stable with the 
inclusion of socio-demographic controls as well as regional level and individual fixed effects. 
This result is in line with previous studies who also find an increase in risk taking after 
exposure to violence and natural disasters (Eckel et al., 2009; Voors et al., 2012; Hanaoka et 
al., 2014; Page et al., 2014). Eckel et al. (2009) investigate the link between experience with 
                                                          
3
 We do not find any significant effect of experiencing extreme weather related damage on patience of 
households in our study. 
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Katrina hurricane and individual risk preference among evacuees shortly after they were 
evacuated and transported to Houston. They find that the evacuees exhibit risk-loving 
behaviour. Similarly, Hanaoka et al. (2014) find that people who experienced larger intensity 
of earthquake in Japan became more risk tolerant. Both studies suggest that this could be due 
to emotional responses to natural disasters. Hanaoka et al. (2014) further find that men who 
live in locations hit by larger intensity of earthquake become mentally less healthy 
(standardized average of stress, depression, and sleep problems). They suggest that this may 
be in line with emotional responses. Page et al. (2014) refer to prospect theory and find 
evidence for the postulation of increased risk taking after suffering large losses from flood in 
their sample of households in Brisbane, Australia. On the violence side, Voors et al. (2012) 
investigate risk and time preferences of individuals who experienced civil war in Burundi. 
They find that individuals exposed to the violence are more risk-seeking and have higher 
discount rates while they also display more altruistic behaviour towards their neighbors. 
However, our result is in contrast to other studies that find a significant increase of risk 
aversion after experiencing natural hazards and socio-economic shocks. For instance, 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that early life financial experiences such as the Great 
Depression led to conservative investing behaviour in later life in the US (Malmendier and 
Nagel 2011). Their results suggest an increase in risk aversion. Similarly, Cameron and Shah 
(2015) compare individuals in villages in Indonesia that experience natural disasters 
(earthquake and flood) and find that they exhibit higher levels of risk aversion as compared to 
similar individuals in villages that did not experience such disasters. A number of other 
studies (Di Tella et al., 2007; Callen et al., 2014; Andrabi and Das, 2010; Cassar et al., 2011; 
Cameron and Shah, 2015) also find an increase in risk aversion in response to natural 
disasters, violence, or land reforms. 
The results regarding the control variables are consistent with the findings in previous 
literature. We find that female respondents and those with higher family size are less likely to 
exhibit risk taking while we find positive effects of income and education. The positive effect 
of age seems to be in contrast with previous studies (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011; Voors et al., 
2012; Hanaoka et al., 2014; Cameron and Shah, 2015). However, the literature on age and 
risk taking is far from clear. For instance, Guiso and Paiella (2008) and Mather et al. (2012) 
find older people are more risk taking than younger people.  
Our data does not enable us to identify the channels through which experiencing storm 
damage affects risk preference. We suggest some potential channels in the following. 
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Experiencing a natural disaster may change the way the cognitive and the emotional systems 
are involved in decision-making (Loewenstein et al. 2001) and hence individuals may put a 
higher weight on emotions after trauma, inducing changes in preferences. In line with this, 
Eckel et al. (2009) argued that the risk loving behaviour among individuals affected by 
hurricane Katrina is explained by the emotional state of the respondents shortly after the 
hurricane. Another potential channel could be compensation from storm insurance. Storm 
insurance coverage is bundled with other hazards such as fire. Hence, a great majority of the 
households are insured against storm. The storm insurance penetration in Germany is at about 
92% for home and 76% for contents insurance (GDV, 2015). Therefore, receiving 
compensation for storm damage in between 2012 and 2014 might induce households to be 
more risk seeking. This is also in line with Cameron and Shah (2013) who find that 
remittances mitigate the effect of natural disaster on risk aversion. Finally, individuals might 
have overestimated the expected consequences of negative shocks. However, experiencing 
damage from these events might induce individuals to relax their risk taking.4 
4. Robustness Checks 
We perform a battery of robustness checks. The main results are presented in table 4, focusing 
on the specification including individual control variables and regional fixed effects. The 
coefficients of the control variables (available upon request) do not change significantly 
across the robustness checks and hence are not presented in detail. We first present estimation 
results including households that report storm damage in both survey waves into the control 
group (robustness check 1 in table 4). The estimated effect is similar to the one reported in 
table 3.  
                                                          
4 Another line of literature argues that exposure to natural hazards affects risk preferences through changing the 
environment with which people interact (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Other explanations include 
neurobiological effects (van IJzendoorn et al., 2010) and increasing cortisol levels (Kandasamy et al., 2014). 
Similarly, Voors et al. (2012) suggest selection effects, changes in beliefs, social structure, and preferences as 
potential explanations for the observed risk-loving behavior after exposure to violence in their study.  
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Table 4: Robustness checks of regression of risk preference 
 Robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Extended 
control 
group 
Ordered 
probit 
Exposure per 
se 
Magnitude 
of financial 
damage  Treatment   -0.055 
(0.105) 
-0.042 
(0.054) 
0.006 
(0.157) 
-0.027 
(0.109) Post  -0.095* 
(0.049) 
-0.073*** 
(0.020) 
0.024 
(0.132) 
-0.099* 
(0.053) Treatment ∗ Post  0.226** 
(0.108) 
0.118** 
(0.055) 
-0.020 
(0.151) 
0.142** 
(0.060) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.179*** 
(0.533) 
 3.653*** 
(1.191) 
3.348*** 
(0.573) 
R-squared 0.038 0.009a 0.033 0.038 
Number of 
observations 
6,676 5,729 1,588 5,668 
***, **, and * represents significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at household level. The region fixed effects comprises the 16 regions in 
Germany. 
a) Pseudo R-squared for ordered probit estimation 
Since our dependent variable, risk taking, is measured on an 11-point Likert scale (0 to 10), 
we re-estimate the model using the ordered probit model. Robustness check (2) in table 4 (see 
Appendix table A1 for complete estimation results) presents the results. They are consistent 
with the OLS regression results in table 3 demonstrating that experiencing storm damage 
increases risk taking.  
Our treatment variable is reported financial or health-related damage from storm. However, 
experiencing a storm may affect risk preference regardless of whether they cause damage or 
not. Hence, we re-define the treatment variable now capturing all households that report 
having experienced a major storm in 2014, but not in 2012 (with or without damage). 
Robustness check (3) in table 4 presents these results. We do not find evidence of exposure to 
storm per se which suggests that households have to suffer damage for their risk preference to 
be affected. 
We also use alternative measures of storm damage. Households were asked the magnitude of 
financial damage they incurred (in four categories, starting from below 500 euros to above 
10,000 euros). We re-estimate our model by replacing the treatment indicator with a 
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continuous measure of the magnitude of financial damage. In doing so, we exclude those 
households that report only health damage and those that do not report the extent of the 
damage from the estimation. Robustness check (4) in table 4 presents these results. Once 
again the results are consistent with our main results in table 3.  
Although there is no pre-treatment difference in risk taking between the treatment and control 
groups, we observe some differences in age, income, and household size. Similarly, storm 
damage experience is self-reported and hence there may be differences in the propensity to 
report the damage. Thus, we also estimate our model using propensity score matching. 
Column 1 of table 5 presents propensity score estimates from a probit model while column 2 
presents the matching estimate. The propensity score estimates reveal that households that 
have above average income and household size are associated with a higher probability of 
reporting storm damage while education of the household head is negatively associated with 
reporting storm damage. However, gender, age, and employment status do not have any 
significant effect. The treatment effect in column 2 is consistent with the treatment effect in 
table 3 above.5 
                                                          
5 While we do not have prior periods to test the implication of common trend assumption, we estimate our model 
by re-defining the treatment and control groups through random draws from our data. We do not find a 
significant treatment effect – which is expected. Similarly, we estimate our model for a sub-sample of our 
treatment and control groups with a series of random draws. We find a significant treatment effect which is in 
line with our identification strategy.  
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Table 5: Effect of storm damage experience on risk preference, difference-in-differences matching estimates  
Explanatory variables Probit model Matching estimate 
Average treatment effect 
 
0.202** 
(0.105) 
Female 0.037  
(0.067)  
Age 0.002  
(0.003)  
Ln (income) 0.223 *** 
(0.068)  
Household size 0.074 ** 
(0.030)  
Education  -0.105 * 
(0.062)  
Employment status -0.103 
(0.083)  
Constant -3.023*** (0.508)  
Pseudo R-squared 0.014  
Number of observations 2,903 5796 
Note: ***, **, and * represents significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered at household level.  
Next, we investigate whether the observed difference in risk taking between the treatment and 
control groups could be explained by other factors. First, as argued by Callen et al. (2014), 
mobility and selective migration present natural confounds. We show that location of 
households is not related with exposure to extreme weather events. Out of 6,404 households 
who participated in the survey in 2012, 1,924 households did not participate in 2014. It is not 
clear whether these households did not answer the survey because they did not want to or 
because they moved to a new address due to exposure to natural hazard. The latter may 
confound our results. However, we have asked all 6,404 households in 2012 whether and why 
they have relocated over the past ten years. Out of 2,824 households who moved between 
2002 and 2012, one single household reports natural hazards as the only reason. Additional 
eight households report natural hazards as one of several reasons to relocate. Thus, we believe 
that migration due to natural hazards is of little relevance in our context.  
Second, initial differences in risk taking between the treatment and control groups could result 
in differences in mitigation behaviour. Such differences in mitigation behaviour could 
subsequently result in differences in storm damage and hence risk taking. However, this 
should not be a concern in our case since we do not find any pre-treatment difference in risk 
taking between the treatment and control groups. 
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Third, the observed difference could be explained by other factors such as health and 
economic shocks. We consider reported concern with regard to own health and economy as a 
proxy for health-related and economic shocks respectively. We re-define the treatment group 
as households who answered ‘very important’ to own economic/health-related concerns in 
2014 (but not in 2012) while our control group comprises households that did not answer 
‘very important’ to these concerns in both surveys. We re-estimate our models by using these 
variables as a treatment instead of a storm. We do not find any significant difference between 
the treatment and control groups in risk taking due to economic or health-related shocks 
(columns 1 and 2 of table 6). 
Table 6: Effect of other floods, economic, or health shocks on risk preference, difference-in-differences estimates 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Economy Health Flood 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇   -0.043 
(0.101) 
0.001 
(0.108) 
0.089 
(0.107) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇  -0.099 
(0.065) 
-0.115 
(0.077) 
-0.074 
(0.057)  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇     -0.029 
(0.099) 
0.126 
(0.106) 
0.010 
(0.105) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.196*** (0.647) 
2.636*** 
(0.752) 
2.813*** 
(0.598) 
R-squared 0.035 0.045 0.039 
Number of observations 4,016 2,869 5,061 
Note: ***, **, and * represents significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at household level. The region fixed effects comprises the 16 regions in 
Germany. 
Similarly, we investigate whether experiencing damage from other extreme weather effect 
(flood) explains the observed difference in risk taking between the two groups. As we can see 
from column 3 of table 6, we do not find significant differences between the treatment and 
control groups in risk taking due to flood-related damage experience. The finding that 
experiencing damage from the storm affects households risk taking but not flood requires 
further investigation. We present speculative explanations for why this might be the case. 
Many households are relatively certain in estimating their vulnerability towards floods 
(falsely or correctly), for instance, due to their location. This would imply that household may 
already internalize the perceived threat from flood. This is unlikely to be the case for storm, as 
the vulnerability is much more difficult to evaluate ex ante. Nevertheless, we hope further 
study will shed light on this issue. 
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Finally, we have 470 households who report storm damage in 2012, but not in 2014. With our 
question on storm damage experience, we ask households whether they have ever experienced 
financial or health damage from storms without specifying the year of the damage experience. 
Thus, the storm damage report of this group of households seems implausible since they 
should have reported damage experience in 2014, too. We suggest three potential 
explanations. Firstly, this group of households may interpret the storm damage question as 
only referring to the period after the first round survey. Thus, they may answer ‘no’ to our 
question if they did not experience storm damage after 2012. If this is the case, we can 
consider them as part of our extended control group that includes households who report 
damage in both survey rounds. However, including the 470 households in the control group in 
our main analysis does not change our results. We also do not find any significant difference 
in risk taking between this group of households and households who report storm damage in 
both survey waves. Secondly, it might be the case that the last time they experienced storm 
damage is some years ago as recalled in 2012, but they could not recall it in 2014. Finally, 
following Ashraf et al. (2006), such implausible answering could be mostly due to noise since 
it does not correlate with risk taking as confirmed in our estimation. That is, we compare the 
risk taking preference of these 470 households with our main and extend control groups. A 
positive effect of this treatment on risk taking would confound our main results. However, we 
do not find any significant difference in risk taking among these groups (detailed results 
available upon request). This may imply that the change in risk taking is not affected by the 
potential to remember storm damage experience. We hope that further study will shed light on 
this issue. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the effect of self-reported storm damage on risk preference of 
households. We use detailed longitudinal household survey data that comes from a novel 
representative nation-wide survey in Germany. We exploit the longitudinal nature of the data 
and compare risk taking of households between those that report storm-related financial or 
health damage between the survey waves (i.e., between 2012 and 2014) and those that did not 
report storm damage over both survey periods. We find that storm damage increases risk 
loving. These results are robust to adding a number of socio-demographic control variables 
and alternative specifications. We find no evidence that these results are driven by 
experiencing other extreme weather events such as floods. Similarly, we do not find evidence 
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that the observed difference in risk talking is due to other economic or health-related shocks. 
These results contribute to the growing literature on the effect of natural hazard and socio-
economic shocks on risk preference by presenting evidences from a highly developed country 
context.  
We believe that these results offer an interesting insight on the importance of extreme weather 
on risk preference although care should be taken in interpreting our results. Firstly, in contrast 
to the standard economic assumption that preferences are stable, these results may imply that 
preferences may change due to exposure to extreme weather. However, whether this change is 
permanent or temporary is an interesting question which we cannot answer from our data. As 
argued by Callen et al. (2014), it may be the case that individuals change their risk taking for 
a period of time due to susceptibility of their behaviour instead of their risk preference. 
Secondly, there could be differences among households in terms of recalling damage from 
storm events. This may be the case given some of the households who reported damage in 
2012 but not in 2014. Thus, there may be a tendency for some households to recall these 
events more likely than others. Although our matching estimation mitigates these effects, we 
cannot completely rule out the possibility that the recall capacity may be correlated with 
unobservable time variant factors. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Effect of storm damage experience on risk preference. difference-in-differences estimates (ordered probit 
regression) 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3)  𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇   -0.016 -0.043 -0.042 
 
(0.049) (0.053) (0.054) 
𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 -0.062*** -0.073*** -0.073*** 
 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020) 
𝛽𝛽3( 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇) 0.119** 0.118** 0.118** 
 
(0.047) (0.054) (0.055) 
Female 
 
-0.240*** -0.246*** 
  
(0.037) (0.037) 
Age 
 
0.008*** 0.008*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
Ln(income) 
 
0.131*** 0.137*** 
  
(0.036) (0.036) 
Household size 
 
-0.028* -0.030* 
  
(0.016) (0.016) 
Education 
 
0.087** 0.084** 
  
(0.034) (0.035) 
Employment status 
 
0.004 -0.001 
  
(0.046) (0.046) 
/cut1 -2.164 -0.876 -0.932 
 
(0.043) (0.274) (0.286) 
/cut2 -1.682 -0.390 -0.446 
 
(0.032) (0.273) (0.285) 
/cut3 -1.042 0.266 0.210 
 
(0.024) (0.271) (0.283) 
/cut4 -0.553 0.766 0.712 
 
(0.022) (0.271) (0.283) 
/cut5 0.227 1.100 1.047 
 
(0.021) (0.271) (0.283) 
/cut6 0.275 1.616 1.563 
 
(0.021) (0.272) (0.284) 
/cut7 0.745 2.103 2.052 
 
(0.023) (0.272) (0.284) 
/cut8 1.354 2.725 2.676 
 
(0.028) (0.274) (0.285) 
/cut9 2.038 3.413 3.368 
 
(0.042) (0.278) (0.289) 
/cut10 2.588 4.006 3.965 
 
(0.064) (0.286) (0.296) 
Region fixed effects No No Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.003 0.008 0.009 
Number of observations 6879 5733 5729 
Note: ***, **, and * represents significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at household level. The region fixed effects comprises the 16 regions in Germany. 
